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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Much has been written regarding the United States’ accession to the Madrid 
Protocol.1 Particularly relevant to this article are discussions that relate to the advantages 
and disadvantages of such an implementation from the perspective of the United States.2  
Although most scholars agree on these points,3 no statistical analysis has yet been done to 
verify or disprove these largely consistent views.  The goal of this article is to provide a 
statistical foundation that is beyond theory or speculation and instead goes to actual 
implementation of international trademark filings. 
¶2 This is not to suggest that previous commentators on this subject were inadequate 
in their research efforts, for when their articles were written there was simply not enough 
statistical data to report.4  Now we are at a moment in time where we can capture an 
accurate snapshot of trademark implementation via the Madrid Protocol.  The statistics 
gathered may simply lead to confirmation of the agreed upon advantages and 
disadvantages of the Madrid Protocol implementation.  However, it is also possible that 
the statistics will disprove or weaken these arguments, not to mention raise some 
interesting questions and ideas.  It is important to emphasize that this article does not 
intend to conclude what policies, laws, or circumstances are influencing United States 
trademark behavior, but rather if United States trademark applicants are at all 
disadvantaged as compared to other member countries with respect to the Protocol. 
 
∗  Northwestern University School of Law, Candidate for J.D., 2008. 
1 See, e.g., Thies Bosling, Securing Trademark Protection in a Global Economy — The United States’ 
Accession to the Madrid Protocol, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137 (2004); Baila H. Celedonia, Madrid 
Protocol: Is it the Hoped for Panacea?, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW 195-219 (Practising 
Law Institute, 2001); Maria Guerra, The Rocky Road of the U.S. Accession to the Madrid Protocol: Could 
This be the Year?, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL’Y 525, 525 (2001) (specifying advantages 
and disadvantages to the United States’ accession to the Madrid Protocol) [A.Q. Not sure this pincite says 
what you think it does]; Linda M. Merritt, The Madrid Protocol: Special Issues for U.S. Practitioners, 12 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69 (2003); Charles Samuels, A Big Push Toward E-Government: The United 
States Patent and Trademark Office and the Implementation of the Madrid Protocol, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 535 (2004) [hereinafter Samuels, A Big Push]; Jeffery M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, 
International Trademark Prosecution Streamlined: The Madrid Protocol Comes Into Force in the United 
States, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 151 (2004) [hereinafter Samuels, International Trademark]. 
2 See, e.g., Bosling, supra note 1, at 162-70; Celedonia, supra note 1; Guerra, supra note 1, at 525[A.Q. 
See the query directed to this pincite above]; Merritt, supra note 1, at 86-96; Samuels, A Big Push, supra 
note 1, at 548-57; Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 160.
3 See Bosling, supra note 1, at 162-70; Celedonia, supra note 1; Merritt, supra note 1, at 86-96; 
Samuels, A Big Push, supra note 1, at 548-57; Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 160. 
4 Note that all the cited publications were published prior to 2005.  See Bosling, supra note 1; Celedonia, 
supra note 1; Guerra, supra note 1; Merritt, supra note 1; Samuels, A Big Push, supra note 1; Samuels, 
International Trademark, supra note 1. 
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¶3 The focus of the research efforts will be on United States trademark applicants’ 
implementation of the Madrid Protocol and international filings, as compared to the top 
four Madrid Protocol countries the United States exports goods and services to and 
imports goods and services from.  It just so happens that the top four Madrid Protocol 
countries the United States exports goods and services to are the same top four Madrid 
Protocol countries the United States imports goods and services from.5  Therefore, 
statistics were gathered in relation to the United States and the following four countries: 
the United Kingdom, Germany, China, and Japan. 
¶4 This article is divided into three separate parts: Background of United States 
Involvement with International Trademark Treaties, Statistical Analysis, and 
Conclusions.  It is important to give a background of the United States’ involvement with 
international trademark treaties to set the stage for the United States’ eventual accession 
to the Madrid Protocol and to better understand the reasons for the United States’ 
accession.  The Statistical Analysis section will compare United States trademark 
applicants’ implementation of the Protocol with the implementation of the four 
aforementioned countries.  The Conclusion section will summarize the findings in the 
Statistical Analysis section. 
II. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK 
TREATIES 
A. Paris Convention 
¶5 The United States’ involvement with international trademark treaties began in the 
late 1800s.  In 1883, the United States acceded to the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property.6  This agreement was signed by nearly all industrialized nations at 
the time.7 Most importantly, however, it marked the first in a series of important steps 
leading to the United States’ eventual accession to the Madrid Protocol. 
¶6 Specifically, the importance of the Paris Convention is that it provided trademark 
owners of member countries with equal access to trademark registration procedures in all 
other member countries.   Furthermore, it established the concept of retroactive priority.8 9  
This means a trademark applicant has six months from the date of their first application 
in their home member country to file a corresponding foreign application in order to 
establish the priority date of their first trademark application.  10
¶7 Although the agreement provided a minimum standard of international trademark 
protection in that it sets forth a common standard by which member countries should 
 
5 See Madrid Protocol Member Countries, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); Top U.S. 
Trade Partners, http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/ttp/toptradepartners.html (last visited Nov. 9, 
2006). 
6 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
7 World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
Status, http://www.wipo.org/treaties/en/documents/pdf/d-paris.pdf. 
8 Paris Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2-3. 
9 Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
1, 10 (1998). 
10 Id. 
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review foreign filings, it is significant because it influenced future agreements by 
providing standards to build from. 
B. The TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA 
¶8 Examples of future agreements which built upon the Paris Convention are the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS),11 which came into 
effect on January 1, 1995,12 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which came into effect on January 1, 1994.13  The importance of these agreements is that 
they established the existence of service marks, which were not recognized at the Paris 
Convention.14  Both agreements also established the definition of trademark as a sign 
capable of distinguishing the goods and services of a person or business from those of 
another person or business.15 Furthermore, both of these agreements established the right 
of a trademark owner to enjoin others from using identical or similar marks for identical 
or similar goods or services, where such use would create a likelihood of confusion.16  
The importance of this provision is that countries must now not only consider a foreign 
application, but enforce the rights of a foreign trademark owner. 
¶9 Other important developments which result from these treaties are a higher level of 
protection for famous marks and special provisions which protect geographic appellations 
of origin.17  For example, the United States has to protect the mark “Champagne” to 
represent only goods derived from that particular region of France.  This sort of 
recognition and the recognition of other famous marks, like “Pepsi,” was very important 
to the development of relations between foreign countries.18  Knowing that a popular 
American mark would be protected in France will undoubtedly increase the confidence of 
an American company to expand its business in that region.19  Otherwise an American 
company may be hesitant to establish a presence in a foreign country, knowing that it’s 
 
11 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 
(1994)  [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
12 Id. 
13 Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape Of International Trademark Law, 
27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 433, 435 (arguing that NAFTA and TRIPS provisions closely resemble 
one another and therefore can be discussed together) [hereinafter Samuels, Landscape].  
14 Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at pt. II, § 2, art. 15 (“Any sign, or any combination of 
signs, capable of distinguishing the goods and services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark.”), with North American Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 1708 (1993) (“For purposes of this 
Agreement, a trademark consists of any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the 
goods or services of one person from those of another, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, 
colors, figurative elements, or the shape of goods or of their packaging.”) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
15 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at pt. II, § 2, art. 15; NAFTA, supra note 14, at pt. VI, ch. 17, 
art. 1708. 
16 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at pt. II, § 2, art. 16; NAFTA, supra note 14, at pt. VI, ch. 17, 
art. 1708. 
17 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at pt. II, § 2, art. 22; NAFTA, supra note 14, at pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 
1712. See also JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 1000 (3d ed. 2001) 
(detailed description of how famous and well-known marks are protected under TRIPS and NAFTA). 
18 See Bosling, supra note 1, at 137 (“Globalization demands effective tools that extend trademark 
protection beyond national boundaries.”). 
19 Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 452 (“Adherence will facilitate U.S. business in its efforts to 
sell registered products and services in overseas markets.”).  
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famous American mark could be viably stolen and consequently degraded in that country.  
Overall, this agreement strengthened international uniformity of trademark law.  
C. The Trademark Law Treaty 
¶10 Although established in 1994, the United States did not become a member of the 
Trademark Law Treaty  until the year 2000.20 21  Simply put, this treaty attempted to make 
the process of filing a trademark in a foreign country less burdensome.  To accomplish 
this task the treaty attempted to harmonize differences in areas of substantive trademark 
laws22 that stood as barriers for applicants filing in foreign member countries.  After 
realizing the unrealistic nature of this goal,23 the treaty set forth a list of maximum 
requirements a member country can impose on foreign trademark applicants.24  However, 
it is important to note that this treaty did not provide the one-stop shop that the Madrid 
Agreement and Protocol established. 
D. The Madrid Agreement 
¶11 The one-stop shop for international trademark registrations was finally established 
by the Madrid Agreement (“Agreement”).25  Although the United States never acceded to 
the Agreement,26 it established the basis for the important Madrid Protocol.  The 
Agreement established a method by which a trademark owner from a member country 
could file a single application with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
in Geneva.27  WIPO would then forward this application to all member countries 
designated on the application.28  At this time, each member country would independently 
evaluate the application and either afford the trademark protection or deny it.29  Although 
the Agreement’s intentions were noble from the United States’ perspective, the 
Agreement was negatively prejudicial for the reasons described below. 
1. Requirement of Registration 
¶12 The requirement of registration provided that a trademark must be registered in 
order to file an application for international registration.   Since registration procedures 30
 
20 Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 2004, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo027en.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
21 World Intellectual Property Organization, Trademark Law Treaty Status, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/tlt.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).  
22 Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 437.  
23 Id. at 438.  
24 GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 17, at 1005. 
25 Id. at 1007. 
26 See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 
U.N.T.S. 389, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo015en.htm [hereinafter Madrid 
Agreement]. 
27 Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 442. [A.Q. Again, no such page] 
28 Id. 
29 GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 17, at 1002. 
30 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:31 (4th ed. 
1996). 
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vary widely from country to country,31 those countries with stringent and thus potentially 
protracted registration processes are at a disadvantage when compared with countries 
whose registration processes are less stringent and thus shorter.  Suppose Company A in 
Country X wants to register Mark Z on an international scale via WIPO.  Further suppose 
Company B in Country Y also wants to register Mark Z on an international scale via 
WIPO.  Assume that Country X has a more complicated and stringent registration process 
than Country Y, which ultimately results in a longer registration process.  Even if 
Company A files a trademark application in Country X well before Company B files a 
trademark application in Country Y, it is possible that Company B could achieve 
international registration in other countries (excluding Country X) via WIPO before 
Company A.  
¶13 This is because Company B will potentially achieve registration in Country Y 
before Company A will achieve registration in Country X, even though Company A filed 
for registration earlier than Company B.  This will result in Company B being able to file 
a trademark application via the Agreement at an earlier date than Company A, which 
would give priority to Company B over Company A in those countries where both 
Company A and Company B seek protection.  To further illustrate this unfairness, 
suppose that Company B thought of using Mark Z only after learning that Company A 
created and used Mark Z.  Company B could steal Company A’s idea, and obtain 
international registration simply because Company B filed Mark Z in a country with less 
stringent registration procedures.  32
¶14 Since the United States has a complex registration process, as compared to many 
other countries, the time from application to registration is longer than that of other 
countries.33 Therefore, as illustrated by the example above, the requirement of 
registration puts American companies at a disadvantage compared to companies from 
other countries whose application to registration process is shorter than that of the United 
States. 
2. Central Attack 
¶15 “The ‘rule of central attack’34 set forth in [A]rticle 6(3) of the Madrid Agreement 
constituted another major cause of concern for the American trademark community.”   35
 
31 Guerra, supra note 1, at 529 (“the U.S. registration process is lengthier than most other countries.”). 
32 As one commentator put it:  
An international registration must be based on a corresponding home registration. Therefore, the 
American company will not be able to proceed with an international registration until the US registration 
has been granted for a particular mark. American registrations may not usually be completed before ten to 
twelve months even though there may be no serious objections to the mark or an opposition. The position 
of an American trademark owner, therefore, is entirely different from a French or Belgium Trademark 
owner who may proceed with an international registration practically the next day after his home 
registration which is the same day as the date of filing. . . American trademark owners are anxious to go 
ahead with foreign applications and not to wait for a year or more while their mark is going through the 
registration procedure in the United States Patent Office. 
 Stephen P. Ladas, The Position Against Adherence: The Madrid Agreement for the International 
Registration of Trademarks and the United States, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 346, 353-54 (1966). 
33 Id. 
34 Guerra, supra note 1, at 529; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 14. 
35 Bosling, supra note 1, at 153 (citing McCarthy, supra note 30, § 29:31; Samuels, International 
Trademark, supra note 1, at 443; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 14) (“Across the board authors argue that the 
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This provision set forth that if a trademark owner’s base registration is cancelled within 
five years of the international registration, then the international registration and all 
national registrations based on it are also cancelled.  36
¶16 This provision’s unfairness is based upon similar reasoning set forth in the 
Requirement of Registration section.  A company is at a disadvantage if the company’s 
home country has liberal trademark laws in regards to third-party attacks on trademarks.37  
This is because the country with these types of liberal trademark laws subjects its 
companies to a higher risk of cancellation as compared to other companies seeking 
registration in other countries, which do not have such liberal trademark laws in regards 
to third-party attacks on trademarks. 
This feature is especially troublesome to US firms because it makes the 
continued lawful use of a mark abroad contingent on staving off any challenge to 
domestic rights under the Lanham Act scheme. United States law permits any 
party to petition for cancellation of a trademark within five years after 
registration on any grounds that could have been asserted to bar registration 
initially.  Such post-registration cancellation is not uncommon.  While such 
challenges are frequently settled, the possibility that such a legal challenge could 
also destroy the rights to the mark in a dozen or more foreign countries has 
traditionally made US firms most unenthusiastic about the notion of adhering to 
the Madrid Agreement.  Obtaining separate national registrations, while a bit 
more cumbersome, is frequently more prudent.38
3. Time Frame for Rejection 
¶17 A third requirement of the Madrid Agreement which drew criticism from United 
States opponents to the Protocol is the one-year time requirement in which a WIPO 
application had to be rejected by the country or countries claimed on the application.39  
The fact that the United States’ trademark registration processes is generally more 
rigorous and time-consuming than other countries’ registration process puts United States 
companies at a disadvantage.40  Since the United States does not internally place a twelve 
month requirement on domestic registration applications, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) would have to prioritize all WIPO applications over their 
own domestic applications in order to meet the twelve month deadline, particularly when 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office has a high volume of applications.   Not 41
 
central attack provision of article 6(3) is disproportionately disadvantageous for U.S. trademark owners.”). 
36 MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 29:31. 
37 Bosling, supra note 1, at 153 (“If the home registration is cancelled for reasons originating from the 
domestic laws of the applicant’s home country, all of the international registrations based thereon become 
invalid, even if they are in full accordance with the laws of any or all other member nations.”).  
38 ANTHONY D’AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 307 
(1997).  See also Bosling, supra note 1, at 154 (“This perception was mainly based on the fact that in 
comparison to the laws of most other nations, U.S. trademark law includes a far greater number of grounds 
on which the validity of a trademark registration can be attacked.” (citing GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 17, 
at 1003; Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 443; Guerra, supra note 1, at 529; Leaffer, 
supra note 9, at 14)). 
39 Guerra, supra note 1, at 529; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 13. 
40 Guerra, supra note 1, at 529; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 13; Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 443. 
41 Bosling, supra note 1, at 155 (“Consequently, the USPTO would likely encounter difficulties meeting 
the one year deadline . . . .  Eventually, the USPTO would have to grant preferential treatment to Madrid 
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to mention this prioritization of WIPO applications would inevitably delay the 
application process for United States trademark applicants solely seeking United States 
registration.  42
4. Language 
¶18 The Madrid Agreement also required the WIPO application to be written in 
French.43  Obviously translating a United States national application to French would 
increase costs for United States trademark owners seeking international registration via 
WIPO.44  Furthermore, this requirement accentuated cultural differences, which may 
have influenced the United States’ lack of cooperation in this Agreement.  45
E. Madrid Protocol 
¶19 The United States acceded to the Madrid Protocol on November 2, 2003.46  The 
Madrid Protocol is essentially the same as the Madrid Agreement, but with a few 
amendments designed to meet the objections of nations in opposition to the Madrid 
Agreement.47  Most importantly to the United States, the Madrid Protocol eliminates the 
requirement of registration, alleviates concerns regarding central attack, extends the time 
frame by which member nations must decide whether or not to register a mark, and 
permits the application to be filed using the English language.  48
1. Elimination of Registration Requirement 
¶20 All that is required of a WIPO applicant seeking registrations in foreign member 
countries is a base application.   This puts companies wishing to use the United States as 49
 
[Agreement] applications in order to meet the one-year deadline.”  (citing Leaffer, supra note 9, at 13; 
Guerra, supra note 1, at 529)); D’AMATO & LONG, supra note 38, at 308 (“Thus, if the United States joined 
the Madrid Union, the USPTO might find it necessary to expedite consideration of international 
registrations to ensure that final decisions on registrability were reached within the one-year time period. 
That would necessarily result in an even more protracted decision-making process on domestic registration 
applications.”). 
42 D’AMATO & LONG, supra note 38, at 308 (“Thus, small and medium-sized US businesses, which are 
unlikely to be interested in international registration, have traditionally viewed adherence to the Madrid 
Protocol as a poor bargain – one with strictly hypothetical advantages, but with a realistic possibility of 
delay and expense in the conduct of domestic business and affairs.”); Roger E. Schechter, Facilitating 
Trademark Registration Abroad: The Implications of U.S. Ratification of the Madrid Protocol, 25 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 419, 421 (1991) (small and medium size businesses are unlikely interested in 
international applications). 
43 McCarthy, supra note 30, § 29:31; Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 444; Schechter, supra note 
42, at 429. 
44 Schechter, supra note 42, at 430. 
45 Bosling, supra note 1, at 156 (“[T]he language barrier issue became one of the most doggedly asserted 
complaints brought forward by opponents to the Madrid System.”). 
46 See List of Countries Belonging to Madrid Protocol, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). 
47 Bosling, supra note 1, at 159. 
48 Steven Andreacola, Lanham Act Meets Madrid Protocol and Trademark Law Treaty: The Application 
Process, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 489, 489-93 (2001). 
49 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, art. 
2(1), June 28, 1989, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/madrid_protocol.pdf [hereinafter Madrid 
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their base application for purposes of a WIPO application at no disadvantage when 
compared to companies in other countries having less stringent registration 
requirements.  50
2. Alleviates Central Attack Provision 
¶21 Now a cancellation of a base registration does not automatically invalidate the 
international registrations based on it.51  A company whose base registration or 
application is cancelled or refused has three months to file national registrations with 
each of the international registrations sought on the corresponding WIPO application.52  
Each national application will retain the priority date of the original WIPO application.  53
3. Extends Time Frame for Trademark Offices 
¶22 The time frame in which a national trademark office must reject an application is 
extended from twelve to eighteen months.54  This extended time frame gives countries 
with stringent registration processes and a high volume of trademark filings, like the 
United States, with sufficient time to process both national and WIPO applications 
without having to unfairly prioritize the WIPO applications.  55
4. Language in English 
¶23 Applications can now be filed via WIPO in the English language.56  This of course 
allows United States businesses to file applications without having to bother with 
translating the application into French.  Furthermore, it marks a significant step towards 
alleviating cultural friction between the United States and some member countries of the 
Madrid Agreement. 
5. Advantages/Disadvantages to the Protocol 
¶24 There are advantages to the United States acceding to the Madrid Protocol.57  The 
most obvious is convenience and cost efficiency of paying one fee and using one 
trademark application as the basis for registration in many different countries.58  Related 
to this is that a company does not need to hire a special trademark agent in each country 
 
Protocol] (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). Of course, a registration will suffice for purposes of filing a WIPO 
application. 
50 Guerra, supra note 1, at 531. 
51 Id. 
52 Madrid Protocol, supra note 49. 
53 GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 17, at 1003; Guerra, supra note 1, at 531; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 16.  
54 Madrid Protocol, supra note 49, art. 5(2)(b). 
55 Bosling, supra note 1, at 161 (“This improvement is expected to align the processing time of 
international applications in the United States with the normal time of examination in the USPTO instead 
of requiring a preferred treatment of Madrid applications over domestic applications.” (citing MCCARTHY, 
supra note 30, § 22:32)). 
56 MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 29:31; Guerra, supra note 1, at 531; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 16; 
Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 447; Schechter, supra note 42, at 433. 
57 Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 452 (“Adherence will facilitate U.S. business in its efforts to 
sell registered products and services in overseas markets.”). 
58 Guerra, supra note 1, at 552; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 16; Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 452. 
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the company is seeking registration.59  Before United States’ accession to the Protocol, 
many countries required a national agent before a United States individual or company 
could apply for registration.  60
¶25 Despite these advantages and changes made to the Madrid Agreement, there are 
still critics of United States accession to the Protocol.61  The disadvantages rest partly on 
the differences between United States trademark registration processes and those of other 
member countries.62  The breadth of protection afforded a trademark by the USPTO is 
generally narrower as compared to other member countries who do not employ such a 
registration system.63  In fact “[a] considerable amount of time is often spent during the 
examination process in narrowing the original specification until the U.S. Trademark 
Examining Attorney will accept it.”64  It should also be noted that “U.S. trademark 
practitioners are well aware, the USPTO will not allow registration of a mark for an 
entire class heading as is allowed in some foreign jurisdictions.”  65
¶26 The repercussions of this, of course, are that a WIPO application, based on a United 
States application or registration, will be disadvantaged as compared to companies basing 
their WIPO application on a country which permits an applicant to file for a broad range 
of goods and services.66  An example of such a region is Benelux, which permits 
registration of marks for class-wide headings and conducts no “substantive examination 
analysis.”67  The Protocol does not allow a WIPO application to expand the list of goods 
and services protected beyond what was afforded in the base registration or application 
when applying for registration in other member countries,68 even if these other member 
countries would have granted broader protection had the applicant bypassed the Madrid 
Protocol and simply attempted national registration in these other countries.  It has been 
suggested that companies who wish to secure a broader class of goods or services should 
either file independently in each foreign country in which the company wishes to secure 
 
59 MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 29:32.  
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., Bosling, supra note 1, at 162-70; Celedonia, supra note 1, at 201-19; Guerra, supra note 1, 
at 525; Merritt, supra note 1, at 86-96; Samuels, A Big Push, supra note 1, at 548-57; Samuels, 
International Trademark, supra note 1, at 160. 
62 Schechter, supra note 42, at 433 (“[The Madrid Protocol] either fails to deal with other issues that 
arise because of the details of U.S. law, or it creates certain new problems.”). 
63 Id. (“Accordingly, the scope of protection of an international registration based on a U.S. application 
or registration will necessarily be narrower in some jurisdictions than international registrations in the same 
jurisdiction originating from an Office of Origin that permits a broader designation of goods and 
services.”); D’AMATO & LONG, supra note 38, at 312 (“Under US practice, a fairly detailed specification is 
required, and much of the application process is often devoted to narrowing the description of goods for 
which protection is claimed until the PTO is satisfied.”); Celedonia, supra note 1, at 206 (“Consequently, 
nationals of other countries will sometimes have the advantage of being able to file valid applications and 
obtain registrations for the same mark in their home countries earlier than their U.S. counterparts who rely 
on the Madrid Protocol.”); Leaffer, supra note 9, at 17. 
64 Celedonia, supra note 1, at 203. 
65 Merritt, supra note 1, at 86. 
66 Bosling, supra note 1, at 168 (“Ultimately, this means that U.S. applicants can obtain international 
protection pursuant to the Madrid Protocol only within the narrow scope of their USPTO home 
registration.”  (citing Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 454)). 
67 Celedonia, supra note 1, at 204. 
68 Leaffer, supra note 9, at 17. 
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rights, or file a WIPO application based on an application in a foreign country, which 
allows for a broader classification of goods and services.  69
¶27 Another disadvantage is based upon the “[r]elative [d]ifficulty of [o]btaining a 
[h]ome [r]egistration in the United States.”70  Because one’s WIPO trademark application 
can be based upon a base application, if this base application is cancelled or refused, the 
applicant will have three months to independently file national applications in each 
foreign country in which he or she sought protection in.71  Since it is more difficult to 
obtain registration in the United States than in other countries, there is a relatively high 
likelihood of having to file independently in each foreign country.72  At this stage, the 
convenience and cost-effectiveness of the Protocol is nullified and reversed.73  One could 
avoid this complication by filing national trademark applications in other countries. 
¶28 The last disadvantage of filing a WIPO application in the United States is based on 
the requirement to state either a use or a bona-fide intent to use.74  National applications 
in many other member countries do not impose this requirement,75 therefore, trademark 
applicants in those countries may have a significant advantage over their United States 
counterparts, simply because they have fewer hurdles to jump before filing an application 
or obtaining registration.  Suppose Company A has obtained Mark Z in the United States 
for a particular list of goods and services M.  Further suppose that Company A has made a 
decision not to expand Mark Z into other goods and services N for at least an 
undetermined set of time, and, therefore, could not justify stating a bona-fide intent to use 
on goods and services N.  Unless Company A files national applications for Mark Z 
protecting additional goods and services N in countries that do not impose the use or 
intent to use requirement, then Company A may be prevented from obtaining this 
registration via the Protocol at a later date, when use or a bona-fide intent to use exists.  
This problem is typified when one considers piratical trademark applicants in those 
countries who could file for Mark Z protecting goods and services N before Company A 
begins to use or intends to use the Mark Z in connection with goods and services N. 
 
69 Bosling, supra note 1, at 168 (“Mark owners who put great weight on obtaining international 
protection for broad categories of goods and services may still want to consider filing national applications 
in the countries where they plan to use their marks.”); Celedonia, supra note 1, at 204 (“[I]t may be better 
to undertake direct national filing in order to obtain broader protection.”); Merritt, supra note 1, at 86 
(“Accordingly, a U.S. trademark owner seeking protection of its mark in one of these jurisdictions could 
obtain substantially broader protection for the mark by naming additional goods and services in a national 
application . . . .”). 
70 Celedonia, supra note 1, at 205. 
71 Madrid Protocol, supra note 49, art. 9(5). 
72 Bosling, supra note 1, at 168 (“This [requirement] imposes a special challenge on U.S. mark owners, 
since their applications are more likely to be denied or cancelled than applications filed by foreign mark 
owners in their respective home countries.”). 
73 Merritt, supra note 1, at 94 (“The cost savings and other advantages that may have resulted from 
seeking protection initially though the Protocol will, of course, be lost.”). 
74 Id. at 88 (“[I]n order to file an application for the mark in the United States, the applicant must have 
used or have a bona fide intent-to-use the mark on all of the goods and services named in the application.”); 
Celedonia, supra note 1, 206 (“In the United States, a valid trademark application must contain a statement 
either that the applicant has used, or that it has a bona fide intent to use, the mark in commerce. In the 
United States, an applicant cannot get a filing date until it has either used or alleged an intent to use the 
mark in commerce.”).  
75 Celedonia, supra note 1, at 206 (“By contrast, national applications in many other countries do not 
require a statement of the applicant’s use or bona fide intent to use the mark, and many do not require proof 
of use before the registration issues.”); Merritt, supra note 1, at 88. 
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III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
¶29 Three years have passed since the United States acceded to the Madrid Protocol, 
and there is now sufficient data to draw well-founded conclusions based on actual 
trademark activity.  The next section of this article will analyze United States 
international trademark activity as compared with those from four other Madrid Protocol 
member countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, China, and Japan.  The reason for the 
statistical comparison is to provide a basis to conclude whether or not United States 
trademark applicants are actually advantaged or disadvantaged with respect to the Madrid 
Protocol.76  This is based on the logical assumption that if a particular member country is 
actually disadvantaged in regards to the Protocol, then the country’s international 
trademark filings, as compared to other member countries, will represent this 
disadvantage.77  Of course, comparing every member country’s trademark activity to that 
of the United States would be unreasonable.78  By choosing the top four member 
countries the United States exports goods and services to and imports goods and services 
from, the focus of this comparison is on those member countries which are most relevant 
to United States trademark applicants.  79
¶30 If United States trademark applicants are advantaged or disadvantaged as compared 
to the aforementioned member countries, then the data gathered in this section will 
convey a disparity between these countries in international trademark activity.  Of course, 
the purpose of this article is not to make a determination of what policies, laws, or 
circumstances are driving a specific disparity, but rather if there is in fact an actual 
disparity from the United States’ perspective.  80
¶31 The first table shows how United States trademark applicants reacted when they 
sought registration in one of the foreign member countries that the United States most 
heavily exports to. 
 
76 This article assumes that data stemming from actual implementation, as compared to conjecture based 
on trademark law comparisons between member countries, provides a more accurate basis for concluding 
the United States’ disposition in regards to the Protocol. 
77 The basis for stating that one party is advantaged or disadvantaged is by means of comparison. One 
party is simply not advantaged or disadvantaged; the party is advantaged or disadvantaged as compared to 
other parties. 
78 There are over sixty countries belonging to the Madrid Protocol. See List of Countries Belonging to 
Madrid Protocol, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
79 This assumes that United States trademark applicants are generally more concerned with how their 
trademark activity compares with China, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan than, for example, Albania. 
80 Although there may be other factors beyond those of differences in trademark laws amongst the 
countries which may influence these statistics, this article is not specifically addressing what policies or 
laws need to be changed, but if policies or laws need to be changed. Of course, this article assumes that if 
United States trademark applicants are in fact disadvantaged in regards to the Protocol, then this fact will 
be effectuated in the statistics by a disparity between United States trademark applicants’ activity and 
trademark activity from the aforementioned foreign countries. 
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TABLE 1. 
81 82 83 84 Germany United Kingdom China Japan
United States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via Madrid 
Protocol (from 2004–
Present)
1102 1163 3347 3479 
85
United States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via National 
Registration (from 2004–
Present) 
2125 4882 N/A 14737 
Percentage of United 
States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via Madrid 
Protocol (from 2004–
Present) 
34.2% 19.2% N/A 19.1% 
This table illustrates that foreign national applications in Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and Japan appear to be more popular amongst United States foreign trademark applicants 
than filing in these countries via WIPO.  It appears that United States’ trademark 
applicants would rather spend the extra money in application fees and hiring a foreign 
agent to file national trademark applications in these foreign countries than to seek the 
convenience and cost effectiveness of the Madrid Protocol.  The disadvantages stated 
above regarding the United States’ accession to the Madrid Protocol are most likely the 
basis for this statistical finding. 
¶32 The following two tables are an exact replica of the previous table, except they 
restrict activity to a single year.  The first table describes 2004 activity, while the next 
table describes 2005 activity. 
 
81 TRADEMARKSCAN - Germany, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using 
database identifier “ger-tm”).  
82 TRADEMARKSCAN - United Kingdom, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) 
(using database identifier “uk-tm”). 
83 No online Chinese Trademark Database available in English. 
84 TRADEMARKSCAN – Japan, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using database 
identifier “ip-japan”). 
85 TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) 
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”). 
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TABLE 2. 
86 87 88 89 Germany United Kingdom China Japan
United States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via Madrid 
Protocol (2004)
448 430 1048 976 
90
United States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via National 
Registration (2004) 
910 1639 N/A 5664 
Percentage of United 
States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via Madrid 
Protocol (2004) 
33.0% 20.8% N/A 14.7% 
TABLE 3. 
91 92 93 94 Germany United Kingdom China Japan
United States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via Madrid 
Protocol (2005)
432 446 1420 1524 
95
United States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via National 
Registration (2005) 
830 1730 N/A 5921 
Percentage of United 
States Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection via Madrid 
Protocol (2005) 
34.2% 20.5% N/A 20.5% 
 
86 TRADEMARKSCAN - Germany, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using 
database identifier “ger-tm”). 
87 TRADEMARKSCAN - United Kingdom, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) 
(using database identifier “uk-tm”). 
88 No online Chinese Trademark Database available in English. 
89 TRADEMARKSCAN - Japan, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using database 
identifier “ip-japan”). 
90 TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) 
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”). 
91 TRADEMARKSCAN - Germany, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using 
database identifier “ger-tm”). 
92 TRADEMARKSCAN - United Kingdom, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) 
(using database identifier “uk-tm”). 
93 No online Chinese Trademark Database available in English. 
94 TRADEMARKSCAN - Japan, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using database 
identifier “ip-japan”). 
95 TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) 
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”). 
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It appears from these tables that many United States foreign trademark applicants are 
fairly consistent in their trademark activity from year to year, particularly with regard to 
the United Kingdom and Germany.  The two tables simply reaffirm the fact that when 
United States foreign trademark applicants seek registration in the top countries to which 
the United States exports goods and services to, they will take extra precautions to ensure 
that their trademark receives the full breadth of protection in those countries.  Generally, 
this full breadth of protection is granted by filing national trademark applications in those 
respective countries, rather than filing a WIPO application for protection in that 
country.96
¶33 However, this data is incomplete without a comparison to the other member 
countries mentioned in this article.  If trademark applicants in each of these countries 
react in a similar fashion to United States trademark applicants, then at the very least we 
can find that United States trademark applicants are not disadvantaged in the Madrid 
Protocol compared to these other member countries. The next table presents findings in 
this area. 
TABLE 4. 
Germany United Kingdom China Japan  
Foreign Trademark 
Applicants Seeking 
Protection in United 
States via Madrid 
Protocol




Protection in United 
States via National 
Registration
15317 10592 7921 12485 
98
Percentage of Foreign 
Trademark Applicants 
Seeking Protection in the 
United States via Madrid 
Protocol 
22.6 10.6 16.3 8.8 
These foreign countries clearly use the Madrid Protocol far less than their United States 
counterparts.  This implies that, as compared to these foreign countries, the United States 
is not as strongly disadvantaged in regards to the Madrid Protocol as one may be led to 
believe.  In fact, because United States trademark applicants are using the Madrid 
 
96 Bosling, supra note 1, at 168 (“Mark owners who put great weight on obtaining international 
protection for broad categories of goods and services may still want to consider filing national applications 
in the countries where they plan to use their marks.”); Celedonia, supra note 1, at 204 (“[I]t may be better 
to undertake direct national filing in order to obtain broader protection.”); see also Merritt, supra note 1, at 
86 (“Accordingly, a U.S. trademark owner seeking protection of its mark in one of these jurisdictions could 
obtain substantially broader protection for the mark by naming additional goods and services in a national 
application . . . .”). 
97 TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) 
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”). 
98 TRADEMARKSCAN - U.S. Federal, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using 
database identifier “fed-tm”). 
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Protocol at a higher rate than these foreign counterparts, it would appear that the Madrid 
Protocol provides more of an advantage to United States trademark applicants than 
trademark applicants in the aforementioned countries. 
¶34 However, filing national applications is not the only method by which a trademark 
applicant can bypass the laws of its home nation.  The next set of tables will compare 
WIPO applications submitted by each country.  The focus of this comparison is on the 
percentage of a particular country’s trademark applicants who file WIPO applications 
with a base registration in a foreign country, rather than in one’s home country, before 
filing an international application via WIPO. 
TABLE 5. 99
# Of Marks filed using 
Protocol and Base 
Registration in Home 
Country 
# Of Marks filed 
using Protocol but 
Base Registration in 
Foreign Country 
% Of Marks filed 
using Protocol but 
Base Registration in 
Foreign Country 
 
United States Trademark 
Applicants (2004 to 
Present) 
5809 414 6.7% 
English (UK) Trademark 
Applicants (2004 to 
Present) 
2136 857 28.6% 
German Trademark 
Applicants (2004 to 
Present) 
19003 1666 8.1% 
Japanese Trademark 
Applicants (2004 to 
Present) 
1928 133 6.5% 
Chinese Trademark 
Applicants (2004 to 
Present) 
3104 70 2.2% 
It is evident from this data that United States trademark applicants do not upwardly 
deviate considerably from the practices of the other foreign countries mentioned, 
regarding filing a base application in a foreign country prior to filing a WIPO application.  
This data does not support the assertion that United States trademark applicants believe 
they are disadvantaged with regard to the Protocol to an extent significantly greater than 
that of the other countries analyzed.  Had United States trademark applicants believed 
they were more disadvantaged than trademark applicants of the other member countries 
mentioned, this belief would have manifested itself in either a relatively high percentage 
of foreign filings abroad prior to filing a WIPO application.100  If that option was not 
available or viable to the applicants,  they would not have used the Madrid Protocol at 101
 
99 TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) 
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”). 
100 According to the data presented, the United Kingdom has a much higher rate than the other countries 
listed of using a base registration for WIPO in a foreign country. The other member countries compared in 
this table are relatively similar. 
101  Madrid Protocol, supra note 49, art. 2, sec. 1(1) (the basic application or registration can only be in 
the country (a) of which the applicant is a national, or (b) of which the applicant is domiciled, or (c) where 
the applicant has a “real and effective industrial or commercial establishment").  
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all,102 resulting in a relatively high percentage of national applications in foreign 
countries, as discussed in the first table of this Section.  Both of these comparisons 
weaken the assertion that United States trademark applicants are disadvantaged by the 
Madrid Protocol. 
¶35 Of course it is possible that the trend of United States trademark applicants is more 
indicative of what is actually occurring or will actually occur in the future.  The next 
table describes how United States trademark applicants behaved on a year-by-year basis 
from 2004.  The theory is that, if the disadvantages in dealing with the Madrid Protocol 
are in fact present, then these applicants, as their familiarity with the Madrid Protocol 
increases, these applicants would either decrease their use of the Protocol or increase the 
use of a foreign filing prior to filing a WIPO application.  In fact, the opposite has 
occurred. 
TABLE 6. 103
Number Of Marks filed using 
Protocol and Base Registration 
in Home Country 
Number Of Marks filed using 
Protocol but Base Registration 
in Foreign Country 
 
United States activity in 2004 1576 172 
United States activity in 2005 2543 153 
United States activity in 2006 2253 (prorated) 129 (prorated) 
The data mentioned so far supports the implementation of the Madrid Protocol as an 
effective tool for United States practitioners.  As familiarity with the Madrid Protocol 
increases, it appears United States trademark applicants are relying more heavily on base 
registrations in the United States as opposed to a foreign country.  Furthermore, it appears 
the sheer number of trademark applicants using the Madrid Protocol is increasing.104  A 
peripheral cause for concern is the predicted slight drop off in total WIPO applications in 
2006 from United States trademark applicants.  However, data for 2006 is only prorated 
and is therefore too speculative to bring the issue to surface.  Not to mention the drop-off 
is not significant enough to draw any conclusions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶36 Based on actual data, an argument cannot be made that United States trademark 
applicants are at a severe disadvantage with regard to the Madrid Protocol when 
compared to a select group of nations.  The aforementioned analysis shows two methods 
by which a country could bypass their own trademark laws and file in a foreign country: 
(1) filing a national application in a foreign country; and (2) filing a national application 
in a foreign country and using that application as the base application for a WIPO 
 
102 Among the countries analyzed in this article, the United States is second only to Germany for WIPO 
trademark filings from 2004 to present. With regard to all member countries, the United States filed the 
third most trademark applications in 2005, jumping from sixth place in 2004.  See Press Release 437, 
WIPO, Record Number Of International Trademark Applications In 2005 With Germany Leading For 13th 
Consecutive Year (Feb. 9, 2006, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2006/wipo_pr_2006_437.html) (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
103 Id. 
104 In particular, there was a significant rise in filings between 2004 and 2005. 
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application.  After comparing this activity between the United States and a select group 
of member countries, there is no statistical deviation that suggests that the United States 
is at a disadvantage with regard to the Madrid Protocol.  Of course, as compared to every 
member country of the Madrid Protocol, United States trademark applicants may not be 
the ones who benefit the most from implementation of the Madrid Protocol, but this data 
shows that they are not benefiting the least. 
¶37 However, a deeper concern may be that all nations mentioned in this article do not 
find the Madrid Protocol to be sufficiently advantageous as compared to filing nationally 
in a foreign country. This larger concern, however, may only be fully addressed if 
complete harmonization of substantive trademark law is achieved.  As long as there is an 
advantage to filing nationally within a foreign country, one can continue to expect 
national applications to be the predominant method by which applicants seek protection 
in a foreign country. 
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